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Abstract
Identity-based proxy re-encryption schemes have been proposed to shift the
burden of managing numerous files from the owner to a proxy server. Nevertheless, the existing solutions suffer from several drawbacks. First, the access
permission is determined by the central authority, which makes the scheme
impractical. Second, they are insecure against the collusion attacks. Finally, only queries from the same domain (intra-domain) are considered. We
note that one of the main applications of identity-based proxy re-encryption
schemes is in the cloud computing scenario. Nevertheless, in this scenario,
users in different domains can share files with each other. Therefore, the
existing solutions do not actually solve the motivating scenario, when the
scheme is applicable for cloud computing. Hence, it remains an interesting
and challenging research problem to design an identity-based data storage
scheme which is secure against the collusion attacks and supports intradomain and inter-domain queries. In this paper, we propose an identitybased data storage scheme where both queries from the intra-domain and
inter-domain are considered and collusion attacks can be resisted. Furthermore, the access permission can be determined by the owner independently.
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1. Introduction
In cloud computing, users can utilize powerful computing resources and
obtain ample storage spaces. This is called database-as-a-service (DaaS) 1,2 ,
software-as-a-service (SaaS) 3,4,5 or infrastructure as a service (IaaS) 5,6,7 . Although it brings users with great convenience, the security issues in cloud
computing are the primary concerns of users 3,8 .
Armbrust et al. 3 gave a view of cloud computing and listed top ten obstacles and opportunities for cloud computing. The first obstacle is availability/business continuity where users in cloud computing are concerned about
whether the computing services have adequate availability. The approach to
overcome this obstacle is to use multiple cloud servers. The second obstacle
is data lock-in, where users cannot extract their data from one site to run on
another site. The potential solution for this obstacle can be hybridised: cloud
computing and standardized APIs. The third obstacles is data confidentiality and audibility. Security issues in cloud computing include threats from
inside and outside the cloud. This obstacle could be overcome by applying
encryption and firewall techniques. The cloud server should be responsible
for physical layer security; while the user should be responsible for the application layer security. The fourth obstacle is data transfer bottlenecks as
users want to transfer data with minimized cost. The method to reduce the
high cost of internet transfer is shipping disk. The fifth obstacle is performance unpredictability as network and disk I/O sharing are problematic.
This obstacle can be handled by improving the architectures and operating
systems. The sixth obstacle is scalable storage. The method to resolve this
obstacle is to create a storage system which would not only satisfy existing
programmer expectations in regard to durability, high availability, and the
ability to manage and query data, but also combine them with the cloud advantages of scaling arbitrarily up and down on demand. The seventh obstacle
is bugs in large-scale distributed systems, namely how to remove the errors
in distributed systems. This obstacle can be overcome by reliance on virtual
machines. The eighth obstacle is scaling quickly as the cost is computed
differently, depending on the virtualization level. The method to handle this
obstacle is to scale automatically so that users can save their money. The
ninth obstacle is reputation rate sharing where one user’s bad behavior can
affect the reputation of other users using the same cloud. The opportunity
to resolve this obstacle is to create reputation-guarding services. The tenth
obstacle is software licensing, namely the licensing model of commercial soft2

ware cannot match well with the utility computing. This obstacle can be
overcome by providing open source or changing the licensing structures. In
these obstacles, the first three affect the adoption of cloud computing, the
next five affect the growth of cloud computing, and the last two are policy
and business obstacles. Therefore, to improve the adoption of cloud computing, a desirable scheme should provide the following properties. First, it
can provide confidentiality to the sensitive data. Second, multiple service
providers can co-exist. Third, it can make services available across domains.
In data storage systems 9,10 , users can store their data to an external
proxy servers to reduce the maintenance cost and enhance the access and
availability. To protect the confidentiality of the outsourced files, the owner
encrypts them prior to outsourcing them to an untrusted proxy server. The
proxy server can perform some functions on the ciphertexts, such that an
authorized user can access the desired sensitive files. Samarati and Vimercati 11 addressed the privacy issues in data outsourcing expanding from the
data confidentiality to data utility, and pointed out some research topics in
the protection of the outsourced data. Kher and Kim 12 surveyed the data
storage systems comprehensively and divided them into three types based on
their security services: networked file systems (NFS), storage-based intrusion
detection systems (SBIDS) and cryptographic file systems (CFS).
In this paper, we propose an identity-based data storage scheme which is
applicable to cloud computing.
1.1. Related Work
Proposed by Mambo and Okamoto 13 , a proxy cryptosystem is a system
where a user can delegate his/her decryption right to a designated decrypter.
Subsequently, Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss 14 extended this notion by introducing the concept of proxy re-encryption (PRE). In this new cryptographic
primitive, a proxy server can transfer a ciphetext designated for one user to
another ciphertext designated for another user without the need to have the
knowledge on the plaintext. Since then, some useful PRE schemes have been
proposed accordingly 15,16,17,18,19 . Weng, et al. 20 proposed a new PRE scheme
called conditional PRE (C-PRE). In this scheme, only the ciphertexts which
satisfy the condition given by the original decryptor can be transferred to
the ciphertexts for a designated decryptor, instead of all ciphertexts. Subsequently, Fang, et al. 21 extended the notion of C-PRE to be hierarchical CPRE (HC-PRE). In this scheme, a proxy server can delegate his re-encryption
right to other proxy servers under a specified condition. Furthermore, they
3

pointed out some application scenarios, such as ZigBee security for visitors
in home automaton, privacy-preserving location sharing protocol etc.
Ateniese, et al. 22 improved the concept of PRE and employed it to data
storage. In their scheme, the owner encrypts his/her files and outsources
them to a proxy server. The proxy server can transfer a ciphertext for the
owner to a ciphetext for the requester if and only if he has obtained a reencryption key from the owner.
Introduced by Shamir 23 , identity-based encryption (IBE) is an efficient
cryptographic system where the public key can be any arbitrary string and
the secret key is extracted from a trusted party called private key generator
(PKG). Boneh and Franklin 24 proposed the first practical IBE scheme based
on the bilinear group. Since its seminal introduction, IBE schemes 25,26 have
been discussed extensively as in this new cryptographic notion, the need for
public key infrastructure (PKI) has been eliminated efficiently.
Ivan and Dodis 27 proposed two identity-based proxy encryption schemes
where the master secret key held by the PKG is split into two parts. One is for
the user and the other is for the proxy server. Then, the user can cooperate
with the proxy server to decrypt a ciphertext. Unfortunately, these schemes
are not secure against the collusion attacks 22 as the user and the proxy server
can collaborate to compute the master secret key.
Green and Ateniese 28 introduced the concept of identity-based proxy reencryption (IBPRE). In an IBPRE scheme, a proxy server can transfer a
ciphertext encrypted under one identity to a ciphertext encrypted under
another identity without learning the contents of the plaintext.
Subsequently, Matsuo 29 proposed two IBPRE schemes. In the first scheme,
a ciphertext encrypted under traditional PKI can be transferred to a ciphertext encrypted under an identity in IBE schemes. Meanwhile, the second
scheme is proposed to transfer a ciphetext encrypted under the identity of
the original decyprter to a ciphertext encrypted under the identity of the
designated decrypter.
Wang, et al. 30,31 proposed two new IBPRE schemes. In 30 , they discussed
the relationships between the IBPRE secure against chosen plaintext attacks
and the PRE properties: unidirectional, nontransferable and collusion safe.
It was proposed 31 that the proxy server can transfer a ciphertext for the
original decrypter to a ciphertext for the designated decrypter, and decrypt
the ciphertext for the original decrypter. Additionally, the original decrypter
can revoke the decryption and re-encryption rights of the proxy server. In
the schemes due to 29,30,31 , the re-encryption key must be computed with the
4

Figure 1: Identity-based Data Storage Supporting Intra-Domain Query

help of the PKG.
Chu and Tzeng 32 proposed two IBPRE schemes in the standard model.
Unfortunately, these schemes 28,32 are not secure against the collusion attacks.
If the designated decrypter can compromise the proxy server, he can obtain
the secret key of the original decrypter.
In all the above IBPRE schemes, only the intra-domain setting is considered, namely both the original decrypter and the designated decrypter
should come from the same domain. Tang, Hartel and Jonker 33 made an important step by firstly proposing the IBPRE scheme where the inter-domain
setting is considered, namely the proxy server can transfer a ciphertext for
the original decrypter in a domain to a ciphertext for the designated decrypter in another domain. Although this scheme is not secure against the
collusion attacks, they made an important step from intra-domain IBPRE
to inter-domain IBPRE. We review this scheme in section 2.4.
To clarify, we depict IBPRE schemes which support intra-domain query
and inter-domain query in Figure 1 and Figure 2, respectively.

5

Figure 2: Identity-based Data Storage Supporting Inter-Domain Query

1.2. Our Contribution
Cloud computing is a distributed system where multiple domains co-exist
together. It is desirable that users in different domains can share sensitive
data with others. Therefore, a sound identity-based data storage scheme in
cloud computing should support not only the intra-domain query but also
the inter-domain query. However, current identity-based proxy re-encryption
schemes cannot be employed in cloud computing as they cannot support
inter-domain query and resist collusion attacks. In this paper, we propose
an identity-based data storage scheme which support both intra-domain and
inter-domain queries. In our scheme, the re-encryption key is computed
by the data owner independently without the help of the PKG. For one
query, the requester can only access one file of the owner, while the requester
and the proxy server can cooperatively access all the files of the owner in
previous schemes as the access permission (re-encryption key) is not bound
to the ciphertext in these schemes. Furthermore, our scheme is secure against
the collusion attacks and selective-identity secure in the standard model.
Therefore, our scheme can improve the adoption of cloud computing as it
can overcome the first three obstacles 3 .
6

1.3. Roadmap
In Section 2, we introduce the preliminaries used throughout this paper. An
identity-based data storage scheme supporting intr-domain and inter-domain
queries is proposed and proven in Section 3. We implement our scheme in
the PBC library in Section 4. Section 5 concludes this paper.
2. Preliminaries
R

In the rest of this paper, by s ← S, we denote s is selected from S at
R
random. If S is a finite set, by s ← S, we denote s is selected uniformly from
S. By F (x) → y, we denote y is obtained by running the algorithm F on
input x. A function  : Z → R is negligible if, for all z ∈ Z, there exists an
integer k ∈ Z such that (x) ≤ x1z when x > k.
2.1. Identity-based Data Storage
There are four entities in an identity-based data storage scheme: the
private key generator (PKG), the data owner, the proxy server (PS) and
the requester. The PKG validates the users’ identities and issues secret
keys to them. The data owner encrypts his files and outsources them to the
proxy server. He validates the requesters and issues access permissions to the
proxy sever. The proxy server stores the ciphertexts and can transfer them
to ciphertexts for the requester when he obtains corresponding re-encryption
keys from the owner. The requester can decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext.
An identity-based data storage scheme supporting intra-domain and interdomain queries consists of the following algorithms:
Setup(1` ) → (params, (MSK1 , P K1), (MSK2 , P K2 )). This algorithm takes
as inputs a security parameters 1` and outputs the public parameters
params, master secret-public key pairs (MSK1 , P K1 ) and (MSK2 ,
P K2 ) for P KG1 in domain D1 and P KG2 in domain D2 , respectively.

KeyGen(params, ID, MSKi ) → SKID . This algorithm takes as inputs the
public parameters params, an identity ID in the domain Di and the
master secret key MSKi , and outputs a secret key SKID for the identity ID, where i ∈ {1, 2}.

7

Encryption(params, ID, M) → CT. This algorithm takes as inputs the public parameters params, the identity ID and the message M, and outputs the ciphertext CT = Encrypt(params, ID, M). It sends the ciphertext CT to the proxy server P Si in the domain Di , where i =
{1, 2}.
Query(ID 0, SKID0 , CT ) → Θ. The requester R with identity ID 0 queries
the proxy server on the ciphertext CT . This algorithm takes as input
the requester’s identity ID 0 , secrete key SKID0 and the ciphertext CT ,
and outputs an authentication information Θ. The requester sends Θ
to the proxy server P Si . P Si works as follows:
1. Both the owner and the requester are in the same domain. The
proxy server P Si sends (ID 0, Θ, CT ) to the owner.
2. The owner and the requester are in different domains. Suppose
that the owner is in the domain Di and the requester is in the
domain D3−i , where i = {1, 2}. The proxy server P Si sends
(ID 0 , P K3−i , Θ, CT ) to the owner.
Permission(params, ID 0 , CT, SKID ) → AK. The owner validates the requester by verifying the authentication information Θ. If the requester
is legal, this algorithm takes as inputs the public parameters params,
the requeseter’s identity ID 0 , the intended ciphertext CT and the
owner’s secret key SKID , and outputs an access key (re-encryption
key) AK. It sends AK to the proxy server P Si .
Re-encryption(params, ID 0 , AK, CT ) → CT 0 . This algorithm takes as inputs the public parameters params, the requester’s identity ID 0 , the
access key AK and the ciphertext CT , and outputs the re-encrypted
ciphertext CT 0 = Encrypt(params, ID 0 , M).
Decryption. There are two algorithms. One is for the owner and the other
is for the requester.
1. Decryption1 (params, SKID , CT ) → M. This algorithm takes as
inputs the public parameters params, the owner’s secrete key
SKID and the ciphertext CT , and outputs the message M.
8

2. Decryption2 (params, SKID0 , CT 0 ) → M. This algorithm takes as
inputs the public parameters params, the requester’s secrete key
SKID0 and the re-encrypted ciphertext CT 0 , and outputs the message M.
Definition 1. We say an identity-based data storage scheme supporting intradomain and inter-domain queries is correct if


Decryption1 (params, Setup(1` ) → (params, MSK, P K);
KeyGen(params, ID, MSK) → SKID ;  = 1
Pr  SKID , CT ) → M
Encryption(params, ID, M) → CT
and





Pr 





Setup(1` ) → (params, MSK, P K);
KeyGen(params, ID, MSK) → SKID ;
Decryption2 (params KeyGen(params, ID 0, MSK) → SKID0 ;
SKID0 , CT 0) → M
Permission(params, ID 0 , CT, SKID )
→ AK;
Re-encryption(params, ID 0 , AK, CT )
→ CT 0







=1





where the probability is taken over the random coins which all the algorithms
in the scheme consumes.
2.2. Security Model
The following game is used to formalize the security model of identitybased data storage scheme supporting intra-domain and inter-domain queries.
This model is derived from the selective-identity secure IBE scheme 34 . The
game is run between a challenger C and an adversary A as follows:
Initialization. A submits an identity ID ∗ with which he wants to be challenged to C. Let ID ∗ be in the domain Di where i ∈ {1, 2}.
Setup. C runs Setup(1` ) to generate the public parameters params and
the secret-public key pairs (MSK1 , P K1) for the P KG1 in D1 and
(MSK2 , P K2) for the P KG2 in D2 . It sends (params, P K1, P K2 ) to
A.
Phase 1. A can adaptively make the following queries:
9

1. Secret Key Query. A can query secret key for an identity ID in
Di or D3−i , where the only constrains is ID 6= ID ∗ and i ∈
{1, 2}. C runs KeyGen (params, ID, MSKi ) to generate a secret
key SKID for ID. C responds A with SKID . This query can be
made multiple times.
2. Permission Query. A can query permission on (ID, ID 0) where the
restrict is ID 6= ID ∗ and ID 0 6= ID ∗ . C runs KeyGen(params,
ID, MSKi ) to extract a secret key SKID , then runs Permission
(params, ID 0 , SKID ) to obtain AK. C responds A with AK.
This query can be made multiple times.

Challenge. A submits two messages M1 and M2 with equal length. C flips
an unbiased coin with {0, 1} and obtains b ∈ {0, 1}. He computes
CT ∗ = Encryption(params, ID ∗ , Mb ) and sends CT ∗ to A.
Phase 2. A can adaptively make the following additional queries:
1. Secret key Query. A can query secret key for an identity ID, where
ID 6= ID ∗ . C responds as in Phase 1.
2. Permission Query. A can query permission on (ID, ID 0) where the
restriction is ID 6= ID ∗ and ID 0 6= ID ∗ . C responds as in Phase
1.
Guess. A outputs his guess b0 on b. A wins the game if b0 = b.
Definition 2. An identity-based data storage scheme supporting intra-domain
and inter-domain queries is (T, q1 , q2 , (`))-selective identity and chosen plaintext (IND-sID-CPA) secure if no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A
making at most q1 secrete key queries and q2 permission queries can win the
game with the advantage
1
AdvAIND-sID-CPA = | Pr[b0 = b] − | ≥ (`)
2
in the above model.
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2.3. Complexity Assumption
Let G and Gτ be two multiplicative groups with prime order p and g be a
generator of the group G. A bilinear map e : G × G → Gτ is a map between
the groups G and Gτ with the following properties.
1. Bilinearity. For all x, y ∈ Zp and u, v ∈ G, e(ux , v y ) = e(x, y)xy .
2. Non-degeneracy. e(g, g) 6= 1 where 1 is the identity element of the group
Gτ .
3. Computability. For all u, v ∈ G, there exists an efficient algorithm to
compute e(u, v).
Let GG(1` ) be a generator of bilinear group, which takes as input a security
parameter 1` and outputs a bilinear group (e, p, G, Gτ ) with prime order p.
Definition 3. (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Assumption 24 .) Let
R
a, b, c, z ← Zp , GG(1` ) → (e, p, G, Gτ ) and g be a generator of the group G.
We say that the DBDH assumption holds in (e, p, G, Gτ ) if no probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary A can distinguish (A, B, C, Z) = (g a , g b , g c, e(g, g)z )
from (A, B, C, Z) = (g a , g b, g c , e(g, g)abc) with the advantage
AdvADBDH = | Pr[A(A, B, C, e(g, g)z ) = 1]−Pr[A(A, B, C, e(g, g)abc = 1]| ≥ (`)
where the probability is token over the random choices of a, d, c, z and the bits
consumed by A.
2.4. Inter-domain identity-based proxy re-encryption in 33
In this section, we demonstrate a collusion attack against Tang, Hartel
and Jonker’s scheme 33 . For completeness, we will first describe Tang, Hartel
and Jonker’s scheme and subsequently, the collusion attack against it.
Tang, Hartel and Jonker’s scheme 33 works as follows:
Setup1 (1` ). This algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1` and outputs a bilinear group (e, p, G, Gτ ) and hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G
and H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G. Let g be a generator of G. P KG1 generates his
R
master secret α1 ← Zp and public key y1 = g α1 . The public parameters
are (e, p, G, Gτ , g, y1, H1 , H2 ) and the master secret key is α1 .

11

KeyGen1 (α1 , ID). This algorithm takes as input the master secret key α1
and an identity ID, and computes SKID = H1 (ID)α1 . The secret key
for the identity ID is SKID .
R

Encryption1 (M, ID). To encrypt a message M, this algorithm selects s ← Zp
and computes
C0 = M · e(y1 , H1 (ID))s and C1 = g s .
The ciphertext is CT = (C0 , C1 ).
Decryption1 (CT, SKID ). This algorithm takes as input the secret key of
original decrypter SKID and the ciphertext CT , and computes
M=

C0
.
e(C1 , SKID )

Suppose that P KG2 generates master secret and pubic key pair (α2 , y2 )
and setups another IBE scheme with algorithms (Setup2 , KeyGen2 , Encryption2 ,
Decryption2 ), where y2 = g α2 . Suppose that the designated decrypter with
identity ID 0 is registered with P KG2 and obtains secret key SKID0 .
RKeyGen(SKID , ID 0 ). To generate a re-encryption key for ID 0 , this algoR
rithm selects X ← {0, 1}∗, and computes
R1 = H1 (ID)−α1 · H2 (X) and R2 = Encryption2 (X, ID 0 ).
The re-encryption key is (R1 , R2 ).
Re-encryption(CT, R1 , R2 , ID 0). To encrypt the ciphertext CT , this algorithm takes as input the ciphertext CT , the re-encryption key (R1 , R2 )
and the identity ID 0 and computes
C10 = Encryption2 (C1 , ID0 ), C20 = R2 and C30 = C0 · e(C1 , R1 · H2 (C1 )).
The re-encrypted ciphertext is CT 0 = (C10 , C20 , C30 ).

12

Decryption3 (CT 0 , SKID0 ). The designated decrypter uses his secret key
SKID0 to compute W1 = Decryption2 (C01 , SKID0 ), W2 = Decryption2 (C20 ,
SKID0 ) and
C30
M=
e(W1 , H2(W2 ) · H2 (W1 ))
Collusion Attacks. If the designated decrypter can compromise the proxy
server, he can obtain the re-encryption key (R1 , R2 ). Then, he can use his
secret key SKID0 to compute X = Decryption2 (R2 , SKID0 ). Therefore, he
can compute the secret key of the original decrypter SKID = H2R(X)
.

1
3. Identity-Based Data Storage Scheme in Cloud Computing
In this section, we propose an identity-based data storage scheme supporting intra-domain and inter-domain queries and prove its security. In our
scheme, the access permission can be determined by the data owner independently without the need of the PKG. Especially, the access permission
is bound to the requested ciphertext. Furthermore, our scheme is secure
against the collusion attacks.
Overview. Our aim is to design an identity-based data storage scheme where
multiple domains can co-exist and users can share files across domains. For
simplicity, suppose that there are two domains: D1 and D2 . At first, the
private key generator P KGi in the domain Di generates his secret-public
pair (ξi , (gi , hi )) where i ∈ {1, 2}. Then, users in the domain Di authenticate
themselves to the P KGi and obtain secret keys from P KGi . Prior to outsourcing the data, the data owner encrypts it under his identity ID. Then,
the owner sends the ciphertext to the proxy server P S. P S validates the
ciphertext. If it is computed correctly, P S stores it for the owner; otherwise,
he rejects the ciphertext. Suppose that the P S can detect which domain the
requester is from and the owner can know which file the requester wants to
access from the partial ciphertext. If the requester wants to access a file,
he can use his secret key KID0 to compute an authentication information
(Q, F, KID0,3 ) and sends it to the P S. If the requester and the owner are in
the same domain, the P S sends (ID 0 , Q, F, KID0,3 , C2) to the owner, where
C2 is the partial ciphertext. If the requester and the owner are in different
domains, the P S sends (ID 0 , Q, F, KID0,3 , (gi , hi )) to the owner. To resist the
illegal requesters outside the cloud access the file, the owner validates the
13

requester by verifying (Q, F, KID0,3 ). If the authentication is successful, the
owner creates an access key (P1 , P2 , P3 , KID,2 ) and sends it to the P S. P S
re-encrypts the ciphertext using the access key and sends the re-encrypted
ciphertext to the requester. At the end, the requester can use his secret key
to decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext.
In the inter-domain query, suppose that the owner is in the domain Di
and the requester is in the domain D3−i , where i ∈ {1, 2}. Actually, in our
scheme, the owner in Di can use his secret key to generate an access key1 for
the requester in D3−i . Furthermore, the proxy server P Si can use the access
key to transfer a ciphertext for the owner to a ciphertext for the requester.
Our scheme is based on the IBE scheme 35 . The protocol is described in
Figure 3.
Correctness. The following equations hold.
C1 ·

e(KID,2 , C3)
e(g rID , (g ID h)s )
= M · e(gi , η)s α ID i r
e(KID,1 , C2)
e(η i (gi h) ID , g s)
e(g rID , (giID h)s )
= M · e(gi , η)s
e(gi , η)s · e(g rID , (giID h)s )
1
= M · e(gi , η)s ·
e(gi , η)s
= M,
KID,1
0
· g ID β
ν
Q·F
η αi (giID h)rID
0
=
· g ID β ,
k
kν
KID0 ,1 h · g

P1 =

0

0

P3 = e(C2 , g)ID β = e(g, g)sβID ,
0

C10 = P3 · C1 = M · e(gi , η)s · e(g, g)sβID ,
1

This key maybe not identical to that generated by the P KGi for the requester with
identity ID0 . Here, we just mean that the requester can use it to decrypt the re-encrypted
ciphertext.
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Setup. This algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1` , and outputs
a bilinear group GG(1` ) → (e, p, G, Gτ ) with prime order p, where
e : G × G → Gτ . Let g, h, η, g, h be the generators of G.
R

1. P KG1 chooses α1 ← Zp and sets g1 = g α1 , h1 = gα1 and
ξ1 = η α1 . The master secret key is ξ1 and the public key is
(g, h, η, g, h, g1, h1 ).
R

2. P KG2 chooses α2 ← Zp and sets g2 = g α2 , h2 = gα2 and
ξ2 = η α2 . The master secret key is ξ2 and the public key is
(g, h, η, g, h, g2, h2 ).
KeyGen. This algorithm takes as input the master secret key ξi of P KGi ,
and an identity ID ∈ Zp in the domain Di , and computes
KID,1 = η αi (giID h)rID , KID,2 = g rID and KID,3 = grID
R

where rID ← Zp and i ∈ {1, 2}.
The secret key for the user U with identity ID is KID
(KID,1 , KID,2, KID,3 ). This secret key can be verified by
?

=

?

e(KID,1 , g) = e(η, gi ) · e(giID h, KID,2 ) and e(KID,2 , g) = e(g, KID,3).
Encryption. Suppose that the owner O with identity ID in the domain
Di obtains secret key SKID = {KID,1, KID,2 , KID,3}. To encrypt a
R
message M, he chooses s ← Zp and computes
C1 = M · e(gi , η)s , C2 = g s and C3 = (giID h)s
where i ∈ {1, 2}. The ciphertext for the message M is CT =
(C1 , C2, C3 ). The owner sends CT to the proxy server P Si in the
domain Di . P Si validates the ciphertext by checking
?

e((giID h), C2 ) = e(C3 , g)
where i ∈ {1, 2}. If the equation holds, P Si stores the ciphertext
CT = (C1 , C2 , C3 ) for the owner. Otherwise, he rejects the ciphertext.
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Query. A requester R with identity ID 0 queries the data outsourced by the
owner with identity ID. Suppose that the requester with identity ID 0
R
has secret key SKID0 = {KID0,1 , KID0 ,2 , KID0 ,3 }. He chooses k ← Zp ,
and computes Q = KID0 ,1 hk and F = gk . He sends (Q, F, KID0,3 ) to
the proxy server P Si . There are two scenarios:
1. Both the owner and the requester are in the same domain Di .
The P Si sends (ID 0 , Q, F, KID0,3 , C2 ) to the owner.
2. The owner and the requester are in different domains. Suppose
that the owner is in Di and the requester is in D3−i where i ∈
{1, 2}. The P Si sends (ID 0 , Q, F, KID0,3 , (g3−i , h3−i ), C2 ) to the
owner.
Permission. There are two scenarios:
1. Both the owner and the requester are in the same domain Di .
The owner checks
?

0

e(Q, g) = e(η, hi ) · e(giID h, KID0 ,3 ) · e(h, F ).

2. The owner and the requester are in different domains. The owner
checks
?

0

ID
e(Q, g) = e(η, h3−i ) · e(g3−i
h, KID0 ,3 ) · e(h, F ).
R

If it holds, the owner chooses β, ν ← Zp and computes
P1 =

KID,1
0
0
· g ID β , P2 = gν and P3 = e(C2 , g)ID β .
ν
Q·F

The owner sends the access key (P1 , P2 , P3 , KID,2 ) to P Si .
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Re-encryption. Receiving (P1 , P2 , P3 , KID,2) from the owner, the proxy
server P Si computes the re-encrypted ciphterxt as
C10 = P3 · C1 , C20 = C2 , C30 = C3 , C40 = P1 , C50 = P2 and C60 = KID,2.
The proxy server responds
(C10 , C20 , C30 , C40 , C50 , C60 ).

the

requester

with

CT 0

=

Decryption.
e(KID,2 ,C3 )
.
e(KID,1 ,C2 )
KID0 ,1 · C40 · hk ·

1. The owner can compute M = C1 ·
2. The requester computes E =
e(C60 ,C30 )
compute M = C10 · e(E,C
0) .

0

C5k . Then, he can

2

Figure 3: Identity-based Data Storage Scheme Supporting Intra-Domain and Inter-Domain
Queries

and
0

E = KID0 ,1 · C40 · hk · C5k
KID,1
0
= KID0 ,1 ·
· g ID β · hk · gkν
k
kν
KID0 ,1 h · g
0

= KID,1 · g ID β
0
= η αi · (giID h)rID · g ID β .
Therefore, we have
e(C60 , C30 )
e(E, C2 )0
e(g rID , (giID h)s )
C10 ·
e(η αi (giID h)rID g ID0β , g s )
e(g, giID h)srID
C10 ·
e(gi , η)s · e(g, giID h)srID · e(g, g)sβID0
1
C10 ·
s
e(gi , η) · e(g, g)sβID0
1
0
M · e(gi , η)s · e(g, g)sβID ·
s
e(gi , η) · e(g, g)sβID0
M.
C10 ·

=
=
=
=
=
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Theorem 1. Our identity-based data storage scheme supporting intra-domain
and inter-domain queries is (T, q1 , q2 , (`))-selective identity and chosen plaintext (IND-sID-CPA) secure if the (T 0 , (`)0 ) decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman
(DBDH) assumption holds in the bilinear group (e, p, G, Gτ ) where
1
T 0 = T + O(T ) and (`)0 = (`).
2
Proof. Suppose that there exists an adversary A who can (T, q1 , q2 , (`))
break our scheme, we can construct an algorithm B that can use A to break
the DBDH assumption as follows. The challenger C generates the bilinear
group GG(1` ) → (e, p, G, Gτ ). Let g be a generator of the group G. It
flips an unbiased coin µ with {0, 1}. If µ = 0, he sends (A, B, C, Z) =
(g a , g b, bc , e(g, g)abc) to B. Otherwise, he sends (A, B, C, Z) = (g a , g b, g c ,
R
e(g, g)z ) to B, where z ← Zp . B will outputs his guess µ0 on µ.
Initialization. A submits an identity ID ∗ with which he wants to be challenged to B. Let ID ∗ be in the domain Di where i ∈ {1, 2}.
R

Setup. B selects υ, γ, θ ← Zp and sets gi = A, g3−i = g υ , η = B, g = g θ ,
∗
R
hi = Aθ , h3−i = g υθ and h = gi−ID g γ . He chooses h ← G. The public
parameters are (g, h, η, g, h). The public keys for the P KGi in Di
and P KG3−i in D3−i are (gi , hi ) and (g3−i , h3−i ), respectively. B sends
{(e, p, G, Gτ ), g, h, η, g, h, gi, hi , g3−i , h3−i } to A. The master secret keys
for P KGi and P KG3−i are g ab and g υb , respectively.
Phase 1.
1. Secret Key Query. A queries secret key for an identity ID, where
the only restricts is ID 6= ID ∗ .
R
(a) If ID is in D3−i , B chooses r ← Zp and computes
ID
θ
KID,1 = B υ (g3−i
h)r , KID,2 = g r and KID,3 = KID,2
;
R

(b) If ID is in Di , B chooses r ← Zp and computes
−γ

−1

KID,1 = B ID−ID∗ (giID h)r , KID,2 = g r B ID−ID∗
and
θ
KID,3 = KID,2
.
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We claim that the secret key is computed correctly. We have
−γ

KID,1 = B ID−ID∗ (giID h)r
−bγ

= g ID−ID∗ (g a(ID−ID

∗ )+γ

)r

−bγ

= g ab g −ab g ID−ID∗ (g a(ID−ID

∗ )+γ

)r

−b

= g ab (g a(ID−ID

∗ )+γ

) ID−ID∗ (g a(ID−ID

= g ab (g a(ID−ID

∗ )+γ

)r− ID−ID∗

∗ )+γ

)r

b

b

= g ab (giID h)r− ID−ID∗ .
−1

b
ab ID r̂
Let r̂ = r− ID−ID
(gi h) , KID,2 = g r B ID−ID∗
∗ , we have KID,1 = g
b

θ
= g r− ID−ID∗ = g r̂ and KID,3 = KID,2
= g r̂θ = gr̂ . So, the distribution of the secret key created in the simulation paradigm is
identical to that in the real protocol.

2. Permission Query. A queries permission on (ID, ID 0, C2 ), where
the only restrict is ID 6= ID ∗ and ID 0 6= ID ∗ .
R
(a) If ID 0 is in D3−i , B chooses r 0 ← Zp and computes
0

ID
KID0 ,1 = B υ (g3−i
h)r .
R

(b) If ID 0 is in Di , B chooses r 0 ← Zp and computes
−γ

0

0

KID0 ,1 = B ID0 −ID∗ (giID h)r .
R

B chooses t, k, β, ν ← Zp and computes Q = KID0 ,1 ht , F = gk ,
P1 =

KID,1
0
0
· g ID β , P2 = gν and P3 = e(C2 , g)ID β .
ν
Q·F

B responds with (P1 , P2 , P3 , KID,2 ).
Challenge. A submits two messages M0 and M1 with the equal length. B
flips an unbiased coin with {0, 1} and obtains ω ∈ {0, 1}. B computes
C1∗ = Mω · Z, C2∗ = C and C3∗ = C γ .
B responds A with the ciphertext CT ∗ = (C1∗ , C2∗ , C3∗ ).
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Phase 2. Phase 1. is repeated.
Guess. The adversary A outputs his guess ω 0 on ω. If ω 0 = ω, B outputs
µ0 = 0. If ω 0 6= ω, B outputs µ0 = 1.
As shown above, the public parameters, public keys and the secret keys
created in the simulation paradigm are identical to those created in the real
protocol. Thereafter, we can compute the advantage with which B can break
the DBDH assumption as follows.
If µ = 0, CT ∗ = (C1∗ , C2∗ , C3∗ ) is a legal ciphertext of the message Mω .
Hence, A can output ω 0 = ω with advantage at least (`), namely Pr[ω 0 =
ω|µ = 0] ≥ 12 + (`). Since B outputs µ0 = 0 when ω 0 = ω, we have
Pr[µ0 = µ|µ = 0] ≥ 12 + (`).
In the case µ = 1, CT ∗ = (C1∗ , C2∗ , C3∗ ) is not a legal ciphertext of the
message Mω . Hence, A can output ω 0 6= ω without any advantage, namely
Pr[ω 0 6= ω|µ0 = 1] = 12 . Since B outputs µ0 = 1 when ω 0 6= ω, we have
Pr[µ0 = µ|µ = 1] = 12 .
Therefore, the advantage with which B can break the DBDH assumption
is
1
1
1
1 1
1 1 1
1
| Pr[µ0 = µ|µ = 0]+ Pr[µ0 = µ|µ = 1]− | ≥ ×( +(`))+ × − ≥ (`).
2
2
2
2 2
2 2 2
2

Collusion Attacks. In our scheme, when computing an access permission,
R
the data owner chooses a random number β ← Zp , randomizes his secret key
0
KID,1 by g β and computes P2 = gν and P3 = e(C2 , g)ID β . If the requester
0
can compromise the proxy server, they can obtain V = KID,1 ·g ID β by KID0 ,1
KID,1
ID 0 β
and P1 = Q·F
. If he can compute KID,1 from V , he can compute
ν · g
1

V
Ψ = g β = ( KID,1
) ID0 . However, this is intractable since the random number
β is unknown to the adversary A.

Chosen Ciphertext Security. We can employ the technique introduced in 36
to our scheme to obtain a CCA secure identity-based data storage scheme
supporting intra-domain and inter-domain queries.
Computation and Communication Costs.
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Table 1: The Computation Cost in Our Scheme

Scheme

Our Scheme

Scheme

Setup

KeyGen

Encryption

Query

Permission

Our scheme

6E

5E+5P

4E+3P

2E

5E+5P

Setup

9EG

Decryption
O
R
2P
2P+2E

Table 2: The Communication Cost in Our Scheme
KeyGen

Encryption

P KG → U
3EG

O → PS
2EG + EGτ

R → PS
3EG

Query
Intra
PS → O
3EG + EZp

Inter
PS → O
5EG + EZp

Permission

Re-encryption

O → PS
3EG + EGτ

PS → R
5EG + EGτ

We demonstrate the computation cost and communication cost in our scheme
in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively. By E and P , we denote one exponential
and one paring computation. By EG and EGτ , we denote one element in
the group G and Gτ . We denote P KG, U, O, P S and R as the private
key generator, the user, the data owner, the proxy server and the requester,
respectively.
4. Performance Evaluation
The efficiency of pairing-based schemes is related to the selected elliptic
curve. Literatures 37,38,39 suggested that how to select elliptic curves for efficient cryptographic systems. In order to select a secure elliptic curve, two
important factors must be considered: the group size l of the elliptic curve
and the embedding degree d. To achieve the security of 1,024-bit RSA, the
group size and the embedding degree should satisfy l × d ≥ 1024. Although
the pairing operations on the elliptic curve with high embedding degree is
expensive, the length of the elements in this curve is short. Most of pairingbased schemes are implemented on the elliptic curves: Type A and Type
D 39 . Type A is a supersingular curve y 2 = x3 + λx, where G1 = G2 and the
group order is a Solinas prime. On a Type A curve, the pairing operation is
fastest, but the length of the elements in this curve is longer. Meanwhile, a
Type D curve is an MNT curve y 2 = x3 + λ1 x + λ0 , where G1 6= G2 . On a
Type D curve, the length of the elements in this curve can be shorter, but
the pairing operation is more expensive.
4.1. Benchmark Time
The running time of different operations on the bilinear group is obtained
on a DELL E630 with Intel(R) CoreTM 2 Duo CPU ( T8100@2.10GHz) and
2GB RAM running Ubuntu 9.10. The running time is calculated by computing the average of running the operation 10 times with random inputs
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Table 3: Benchmark Time of Different Operations on Type A Curve (ms)
Pairing
Normal
PP
5.883
2.565

Curve
Type A

G
EP
0.736

M BE
6.278

EPτ
0.142

Gτ
M BEτ
1.242

Table 4: Running Time of Our scheme on Type A Curve (ms)
Curve
Type A

Setup

KeyGen

Encryption

Query

Permission

4.416

16.505

35.509

1.4720

16.505

Decryption
Owner
Requester
5.130
6.602

using the text code from the PBC library 39 . The running times of different
operations on the bilinear group from Type A curve are described in Table
3. By P P , EP , EPτ , we denote the running time of a pairing operation
with preprocessing, an exponential operation on group G with preprocessing
and an exponential operation on group Gτ with preprocessing, respectively.
By MBE and MBEτ , we denote the running time of executing exponential
operations on multiple bases on the group G and Gτ , respectively, such as
ζ = g x1 hx2 .
4.2. Implementations of Our Scheme
We implement our scheme on Type A curve: y 2 = x3 + x, where G1 = G2 ,
the order p is 160 bits, the embedding degree d = 2 and the group size l is 512
bits. Compared with the curves with d > 2, the expensive paring operation
is fastest on Type A curve.
We describe the running times consumed by different algorithms in our
scheme in Table 4. We observe that it takes 4.416 ms and 16.505 ms to setup
the system and generate a secret key, respectively. To encrypt a message,
it takes 35.509 ms. It takes 1.4720 ms and 16.505 ms to compute a query
information and an access permission, respectively. To decrypt a ciphertext for the data owner and the requester, it takes 5.130 ms and 6.602 ms,
respectively.
The communication cost of our scheme on Type A curve is described in
Table 5.
Table 5: The Communication Cost of Our Scheme in Type A Curve (byte)
Curve

Type A

Setup

KeyGen

Encryption

576

P KG → U
192

O → PS
192

R → PS
192
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Query
Intra
PS → O
212

Inter
PS → O
340

Permission

Re-encryption

O → PS
256

PS → R
384

40
35

Running Time (ms)

30
25
20
15
10
5
0

Setup

KeyGen

Enc

Query

Perm

O-Dec

R- Dec

Algorithms in Our Scheme

Figure 4: Comparison of The Running Time Consumed by the Algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Encryption, Query, Permission, Owner Decryption and Requester Decryption

5. Conclusion
Cloud computing is a distributed system where users in different domains can share data among each other. Identity-based proxy re-encryption
schemes have been proposed to outsource sensitive data from the owner to an
external party. Nevertheless, they cannot be employed in cloud computing.
For example, they can only support the intra-domain query and the access
key is computed with the help of the private key generator (PKG). Additionally, the proxy server must be trusted. In this paper, we proposed an
identity-based data storage scheme which is suitable to the cloud computing
scenario as it supports both intra-domain and inter-domain queries. In our
scheme, the access key is bound to not only the requester’s identity but also
the requested ciphertext, and can be computed by the owner independently
without the help of the PKG. For one query, the requester can only access
one file of the owner, instead of all files. Furthermore, our scheme is secure
against the collusion attacks. We proved the security of the proposed scheme
in the selective-identity model.
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